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ABSTRACT
In W v M, family members made an application to the
Court of Protection for withdrawal of artiﬁcial nutrition
and hydration from a minimally conscious patient.
Subsequent scholarly discussion has centred around the
ethical adequacy of the judge’s decision not to authorise
withdrawal. This article brings a different perspective by
drawing on interviews with 51 individuals with a relative
who is (or was) in a vegetative or minimally conscious
state (MCS). Most professional medical ethicists have
treated the issue as one of life versus death; by contrast,
families—including those who believed that their relative
would not have wanted to be kept alive—focused on
the manner of the proposed death and were often
horriﬁed at the idea of causing death by ‘starvation and
dehydration’. The practical consequence of this can be
that people in permanent vegetative state (PVS) and
MCS are being administered life-prolonging treatments
long after their families have come to believe that the
patient would rather be dead. We suggest that medical
ethicists concerned about the rights of people in PVS/
MCS need to take this empirical data into account in
seeking to apply ethical theories to medico-legal
realities.
In the English Court of Protection case, W v M,1
the family of a woman in a minimally conscious state
(MCS) applied for authorisation for artiﬁcial nutri-
tion and hydration (ANH) to be withdrawn with the
inevitable result that the patient would die. As has
been widely noted, this is the ﬁrst such case in the
English courts concerning someone diagnosed as
being in a MCS as opposed to a permanent vegetative
state (PVS) and—unlike PVS cases before and since—
the application was refused. Another distinctive
feature, less commented upon, is that unlike previous
cases concerning PVS patients in the UK, from
Bland2 onwards, the application for withdrawal in W
v M was made by the patient’s family rather than by a
NHS Trust (since the Trust concerned did not believe
that withdrawal of ANH was in the patient’s best
interests). The extensive commentary that this case
has already attracted is concerned with the extent to
which the judgement engaged adequately with the
‘best interests’, precedent autonomy, quality of life
and human rights of the patient (known only as M).
Many articles focus on philosophical arguments for
why ANH should have been withdrawn—for
example, on the grounds that keeping the patient
alive was “incompatible with the legal requirement to
respect the past wishes of incompetent people”,3
because the burdens of ANH outweigh the beneﬁts
for people in MCS4 5 and because of distributive
justice considerations.6 Such arguments extend
beyond the facts of the particular case and articulate
principles that potentially apply to MCS (and some-
times PVS) patients more generally. In this article, we
extend these philosophical discussions further by
bringing them into dialogue with empirical data: our
interview-based study of the experience, and ethical
deliberations, of families who have a relative in a
vegetative state (VS) or MCS.
Following Bland, ANH withdrawal from PVS
patients must be authorised by the courts—and,
under English law (in contrast to the USA), relatives
do not have a deciding voice on this (or any other)
treatment decision for an incapacitated adult family
member. When family views are reported in cases
brought by the Trusts, they are virtually always sup-
portive of ANH withdrawal, with little evidence of
dissent. (See Re G7 for an exception.) In Bland,2
the patient’s father is quoted as saying: “He cer-
tainly wouldn’t want to be left like he is. I would
feel that he should be removed [from ANH] and
the family feel the same”; in NHS Trust v J,8 the
patient’s husband says: “she would not wish her
life to be prolonged in her present condition. I
believe […] she would wish artiﬁcial hydration and
nutrition to be withdrawn”. Similar views are
attributed to the family in many other cases.9 This
may lead medical ethicists to believe that families
are generally supportive of ANH withdrawal for
PVS and MCS patients. It is, however, unlikely that
the views of these families represent the views of
the majority of people with relatives in PVS/MCS,
only a tiny percentage of whom are involved in
court cases for ANH withdrawal: in the 20 years
since Bland,2 fewer than 100 such applications
have reached the courts.
In sum, W v M (and the PVS withdrawal cases
that precede and follow it) is merely the tip of a
very large iceberg usually invisible to medical ethi-
cists. The vast majority of people in PVS and MCS
and their families are never represented in medical
case studies or legal debate. This article explores
salient ethical features in some of these families’
views about treatment withdrawal. We show how
the family represented in W v M—for all its singu-
larity—shares many common features with the
experiences of families of PVS and MCS patients
across England and Wales, but with the critical dis-
tinction that very few of our interviewees,
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including those who believe that their relative would rather have
been dead than kept alive in their current condition, are willing
to countenance ANH withdrawal, still less make (or support the
Trust in making) an application to the Court of Protection. We
suggest that medical ethicists concerned about the rights of
people in PVS/MCS need to take this empirical data into
account in seeking to apply ethical theories to medico-legal
realities.
METHOD
The research reported here is part of a larger in-depth interview
study of the experiences of families with a severely brain-injured
relative. The research ethics committees at the Universities of
York and Cardiff initially approved the study, and we began
recruitment of participants as widely as possible starting with
our own social contacts and via brain injury support groups.
This was made possible in part because the researchers (who are
sisters) themselves have a severely brain-injured sister, and said
so in the recruitment information: ﬁve of the early interviews
were with people previously encountered via our personal
involvement in the networks connected to brain injury (eg, via
support networks in which we participated, events we attended).
We also used snowball sampling and contacted people via care
homes and contacted some who had spoken publicly about their
experience. The study subsequently received NHS approval
(from Berkshire Research Ethics Committee, REC reference
number: 12/SC/0495), and we were also able to recruit via con-
sultants, although all interviews took place off NHS premises
(generally in people’s homes). Prospective participants were
usually approached via email, and all 51 participants were inter-
viewed by one or other of the two authors, both of whom have
extensive experience in interview and focus group research in
the ﬁeld of health and illness, and both of whom teach qualita-
tive methodologies (including interviewing) and have published
widely on qualitative research methods. Interviews were mostly
one-to-one, but occasionally in pairs (eg, a husband and wife
asked to be interviewed together, as did a mother and daughter).
We almost always conducted the interviews without other
people present: exceptions were one interview at which a young
child was present and another which took place in the same
room as the PVS daughter of the interviewee (who cared for her
at home). Interviewees were mostly parents, siblings, spouses/
partners and adult children of the patient. Most patients were
currently either PVS or MCS (some had died by the time of
interview; others had emerged from chronic disorders of con-
sciousness with severe neurological deﬁcits). To maximise ano-
nymity, we avoid giving further details.
The interview guide was deliberately wide-ranging to allow
people to tell their stories in their own ways, and we did not
impose a uniform structure or set of identical questions. During
the course of the interviews, we also answered questions about
our own experiences as sisters of a severely brain-injured patient
when asked, and occasionally volunteered information when it
seemed helpful (eg, to show that we understood and could empa-
thise with difﬁcult experiences). The majority of interviews
lasted between 2 and 4 h (with breaks), the shortest was 45 min
and the longest was 7 h (with breaks). Interviewing started in
November 2010 and continued throughout and subsequent to
the period that W v M received extensive press coverage (in July
2011 and again in September/October 2011). Interviewees occa-
sionally referred spontaneously to the case, and some (including
two families with relatives in MCS who had already initiated
enquiries about ANH withdrawal) were following it closely.
Interviews were transcribed orthographically (with care taken to
maximise conﬁdentiality; Saunders B et al, unpublished data) and
analysed thematically to identify recurrent patterns (themes).10
In this article, we focus on those parts of the interviews where
participants discuss whether or not they would consider ANH
withdrawal for their relatives—and this was systematically coded
by the two authors for the purpose of this paper. After 51 inter-
views, this was a heavily saturated category (ie, we were repeat-
edly hearing the same comments from different participants);
however, very few of the interviewees (at the time of interview)
had witnessed a relative dying from withdrawal of ANH—and
this will be the subject of future work.
FINDINGS
The family in W v M is not unusual in believing that the patient
would have rather been dead than sustained in their current
condition: this view was shared by two-thirds of our inter-
viewees. Those who believed the person would have wanted to
be kept alive were (with two exceptions, both from the same
family) within the ﬁrst 2 years of the precipitating event.
Families generally arrived at the view that the person would
rather be dead only after exhausting all the possibilities that
their relative could make a recovery to a quality of life that the
patient would ﬁnd acceptable. In the ﬁrst few years after injury
interviewees usually believed it was ‘too early to give up’, and
that the person might ‘beat the odds’ to make a recovery to
some meaningful (to them) quality of life. In some cases,
doctors had suggested withdrawing treatment during this earlier
period and interviewees resisted this, claiming that their relative
had been ‘written off ’ as a ‘vegetable’ and was being denied
rehabilitation opportunities. One interviewee, for example, felt
very threatened by clinicians’ suggestions that ongoing treatment
might be futile and described her alarm that ANH might be
withdrawn. She had sought legal advice and been reassured that
this could not happen if she disagreed—at least not without
long delays, detailed clinical investigation and her views being
taken into account. However, she felt she was in a ‘battle’ to
defend her husband and, throughout the interview, discussed
her strategies for not giving the clinical team any ‘ammunition’
that might allow treatment to be withheld/withdrawn. Almost
all of the interviewees who now believed that the person had
suffered ‘a fate worse than death’ had previously ‘consented’ to,
or even fought for, life-sustaining interventions. Some now
regretted this. Opinions then can clearly shift over time with
experience and as the prognosis becomes clearer.
M’s family was typical in this respect. It was only ‘after
several years of exploring all options in the hope that she would
recover consciousness’ (W v M, para 2) that the family (her
mother, partner, sister, nephew and mother-in-law) came to the
view that M would not want to continue to be kept alive. In
outlining the background to the case, Baker J records that:
From an early stage the consensus of medical opinion was that
there was no realistic prospect that any improvement could be
achieved in M’s condition. For some time, the family members,
in particular S [M’s partner] fought hard to ensure that every
possible attempt was made to identify processes of rehabilitation
which might bring about some improvement. (para 15)
M’s sister, B, describes how S “kept saying we have got to
give her every chance”. The judgement summarises S’s views:
He was determined that M was going to get better - I said: “She
is all I have got”. He said that he felt that they, by which he
means the doctors, were giving up on her and he wanted to keep
ﬁghting. (para 119)
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It was only 4 years later, with no signiﬁcant evidence of
improvement, that M’s family ‘gradually came to the view’
(para 16) that M would not want her life artiﬁcially sustained.
As we have detailed elsewhere,11 by the time families decide
that their relative would not wish to have continued life-
sustaining treatment, the patient has usually stabilised and the
only remaining ‘artiﬁcial’ means of life support is clinically
assisted nutrition and hydration. The ‘window of opportunity’
for allowing death in any other way (eg, by withdrawing ventila-
tion) is closed since the person is no longer dependent on other
forms of support.
Rather than actively seek withdrawal of ANH, most families
at this point are waiting for a ‘natural death’. Interviewees
reported that patients now had ‘ceilings of care’ in place, includ-
ing ‘do not attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation’ (DNACP)
and an agreement not to aggressively treat infections (eg, with
intravenous antibiotics). These interviewees often drew a distinc-
tion between ‘going along’ with suggestions from clinicians that
aggressive interventions were no longer appropriate (allowing
‘fate to take its course’) and taking ‘active’ steps. One woman
we interviewed spoke about her husband:
I don’t feel it’s my place, as they are doing at the moment with
‘M’, to go to a court and say ‘I want his nutrition withdrawn’. I
don’t think I could do that. But I don’t think it’s right or fair to
actively take steps to prolong this life. I suppose I’m waiting for
Simon to die naturally. (Kate)
Another made a similar point about her daughter:
When you see she is very ill [with pneumonia] you think, “yes,
the time has come”, you know, and “if this is it, then so be it”. In
fact it’s a sort of relief in a way, isn’t it, to know that there is an
end to it. […] I wouldn’t do anything actively to change it… But
on the other hand, if it ﬁnished I think I’d be relieved. (Ann)
Again, M’s family is typical in having reached this position:
her sister reported that she could not see the point of giving
M antibiotics “to bring her round for years of more suffering
for this—I would rather let nature take its course” (para 116)
and the family seems to have asked that M should not be given
a ﬂu jab (para 109).
What makes M’s family unusual is that they were willing to
request ANH withdrawal. This was considered utterly abhorrent
to most of those we interviewed:
I can’t imagine that she would ever want to live as she is now.
[...] but the [ANH withdrawal] alternative is too cruel. […] [and]
even if they agreed to it, it’s too painful, you know. I couldn’t do
that. [….] You know, we couldn’t put her through it. (Ann)
When they told me that I felt like screaming. I thought, ‘you are
MAD!’ I didn’t even contemplate it. I just don’t understand how
anyone can sanction that law’ (i.e. the common law established
by Bland). (Bob)
I couldn’t believe that that [ANH withdrawal] was the method.
Everybody I’ve talked to has said, “there must be better ways
than that in this day and age.” […] What a stupid, stupid way of
doing it. (Mark)
Failing to feed (or to provide water) to a loved one via what-
ever route (orally or by tube)—even because of the conviction
that they would prefer to be dead—is a highly emotive issue
with deep cultural resonance. One interviewee told us that
ANH had been withdrawn (without recourse to the courts)
from her PVS husband after she had expressed the view that he
would rather be dead. She intervened to reverse this decision
because she found it so deeply disturbing:
I just couldn’t bear that he was starving […] I just thought, what
a horrible- what a dreadful way to live your last days. I just
thought it was awful. (Imogen)
She now regrets intervening because her husband’s subse-
quent existence and eventual death (from untreated gangrene)
was so terrible she does not think that ANH withdrawal could
have been worse:
The gangrene was horrible. Have you ever seen gangrene? It’s so
horriﬁc. It’s like two years earlier he could be starved to death,
now he was going to have to die of gangrene. […] If I go back to
that moment where I said “you can’t starve him to death”, I did
regret it sometimes…. (Imogen)
Another interviewee believed she could have tried to enforce
her husband’s wishes (supported by his legally valid Advance
Decision naming her as proxy), but found she couldn’t bring
herself to try this route at the point at which it became relevant.
I actually got to the stage of not allowing the next [feeding] tube
down but I decided I couldn’t do that for Christmas. I couldn’t
have that on my conscience for every fucking Christmas after-
wards. (Shula)
Interviewees were often concerned that, even with a con-
ﬁrmed VS diagnosis, it was possible that their relative would
experience pain and suffering and there was a widespread per-
ception that lethal injections would be more humane, compas-
sionate and digniﬁed than ‘death from neglect’ as a result of
treatment withdrawal. A brother comments: “There are ways
and means of doing it compassionately. I’d rather her be given a
lethal injection” (Harry). Other interviewees report:
We all thought [ANH withdrawal] was barbaric. But then being
kept alive that way is barbaric [...] I mean it [death following
ANH withdrawal] is better than for ever living that way. But
really, truthfully, what the hell is this? The system has to be in
place where if [surgery and rehabilitation] is a failure, if it hasn’t
worked, then you can help that person die with dignity. (Rose)
I would view it [a lethal injection] as a kinder decision […]
Because if you stop feeding them, they are going to die. If you’ve
made that decision, you might as well do it as humanely as you
possibly can. […] To starve somebody to death seems a particu-
larly cruel thing to do. (Brendan)
Even when families were told by clinicians that the person
would receive palliative care, they still found ANH withdrawal
unacceptable—if not for the patient, then for the rest of the
family. One mother says:
We hated it. They reassured us that, you know, “oh he would be
sedated, he wouldn’t feel any pain.” But we would have to sit
there for up to three weeks to, basically, watch him die. Craig
[patient’s brother] said, “but it’s so awful Mum—I couldn’t bear
for them to do that to Charles.” […] There’s no way I’d ask for
it. No way. (Tania)
Tania adds, “I would rather do it [kill him] myself”.
Many interviewees had thought about killing the patient
themselves—with varying levels of seriousness. (None had actu-
ally done so, but we remove pseudonyms from this section to
maximise anonymity as this is highly sensitive data, and some-
thing some interviewees had, for obvious reasons, not discussed
with clinical teams, and sometimes had not revealed to other
members of their families.) One mother referred to another
legal case widely covered in the media: that of Francis Inglis,12
who killed her vegetative son with a heroin overdose. She said:
“everyone who’s been in our situation can relate to that”.
Kitzinger C, et al. J Med Ethics 2014;0:1–4. doi:10.1136/medethics-2013-101799 3
Law, ethics and medicine
 group.bmj.com on January 19, 2014 - Published by jme.bmj.comDownloaded from 
She says she could not do it herself but: “I wish I had her
courage”. Another interviewee, who unusually was considering
pursuing ANH withdrawal for her relative, commented: “I
wouldn’t say that it had never occurred to me that putting a
pillow over his face might be a kinder way.” A sister told us that
after investigating the possibilities of ANH withdrawal for her
MCS brother and discovering it was unlikely to be approved, “I
personally wanted to take his life illegally”. Although her family
dissuaded her from doing so (not wanting to lose another
family member), she had reasoned that:
However horrible prison was, however humiliating and frustrat-
ing and boring and scary, it would be nothing compared to being
trapped within your own body and in pain. So in all the argu-
ments I had with myself, that’s what I’d come back to… All my
life my thing has been to protect my family. And protecting him
and keeping him alive were in conﬂict. […] Every day that
nothing happened was harming him.
Another interviewee commented:
There was a moment when I contemplated killing her [my
mother] [….] And now my worst fear is that, in the strange
cocooned world with antibiotics on tap where she lives, she may
never die.
In yet another family, an interviewee told us how she planned
a mercy killing because she felt she had promised her loved one
that he would not have to live in a vegetative state. “I took the
thing off his arms a couple of times just to see how loud the
alarm was and what happened you know. Because I thought ‘I
can’t do it if he’s going to be resuscitated’”. She had chosen a
hotel near the hospital in which she planned—after making sure
she had successfully accomplished the murder—to kill herself
undisturbed. It was, however, “a promise I didn’t keep”.
Although, in the end, each of these interviewees had decided
that carrying out a ‘mercy killing’ was not the answer, they were
angry that the current system had, they felt, forced them into
the position where they were contemplating it, and some felt
guilty at their failure to carry through.
In sum, some PVS and MCS patients are being administered
life-prolonging treatments long after their families have come to
believe that the patient would rather be dead. In the view of
these interviewees, this compromises patients’ dignity, violates
their prior expressed wishes and may also cause them pain and
suffering—but as long as an application for ANH withdrawal is
the only legal assured exit route that might be available, most
families are unlikely to advocate for the patient’s death.
CONCLUSION
W v M is the tip of the iceberg in terms of engaging in ethical
concerns about the best interests, precedent autonomy and
human rights of PVS/MCS patients. Whereas previous commen-
tary has focused analysis on the judicial reasoning in W v M,
here we have drawn attention to the fact that this case is excep-
tional insofar as a family has been willing to seek ANH with-
drawal. Our data show that many families are not willing even
to consider ANH withdrawal, however convinced they are that
the person would rather be dead. Those who had relatives in
MCS also usually believed—especially in the wake of W v M—
that their application was unlikely to succeed.13 Philosophical
debate about whether or not ANH should be withdrawn from
PVS/MCS patients will contribute most usefully in applied con-
texts if this lived reality is taken into account, and other ways of
bringing about the death of PVS/MCS patients (eg, terminal sed-
ation) are given full ethical consideration.
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